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This paper examines Social Security benefit claiming behavior in the US using the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) to implement a duration model. It focuses essentially on the rushing/delaying 
behavior of the unemployed and investigates whether older unemployed individuals lacking liquidity 
use Social Security benefits as a safety net in order to finance consumption during an unemployment 
episode. In this way, Social Security might be thought as a form of unemployment insurance allowing 
people to maintain their standard of living during their job search. The purpose of this paper is hence 
to find empirical evidence about the potential insurance function of Social Security benefits, which 
would provide support for integrating Unemployment Insurance with Retirement Insurance even 
before eligibility for Social Security (SS) benefits. I find that being unemployed and in the left tail of 
the income distribution strongly predicts early claiming without retiring, meaning that although people 
claim their Social Security benefits, these unemployed individuals want to stay within the labor force, 
and could use these benefits in their costful job search process. 
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A growing literature advocates the implementation of a system of Unemployment Insur-
ance Saving Accounts as an alternative to the federal system of unemployment Insurance.
Such a private UI system would allow individuals to draw their unemployment compensa-
tion from individual accounts ﬁlled with their own future wage income instead of relying
on the state unemployment insurance beneﬁts, which would provide them with the same
protection as with the traditional UI system while reducing its well-known adverse eﬀects.
Following this line, Stiglitz and Yun [2005] support the idea of a social insurance system
that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program through an individual
account. One way of investigating the feasibility of this system consists in ﬁnding evidence
about some integration between the retirement and unemployment schemes whenever in-
dividuals are given the possibility to draw money from their retirement beneﬁts and use
them as a kind of Unemployment Insurance, i.e. when they become eligible for Social
Security retirement beneﬁts. The US oﬀers an ideal set-up to study this issue as Social
Security beneﬁt take-up and retirement are two distinct concepts, for older Americans
may consider themselves as "retired" if they have already exited the labor force and al-
though they are not entitled to Social Security Old Age Beneﬁts, and on the other hand
may receive Social Security beneﬁts while still working.
Therefore in this paper I focus on the SS beneﬁt claiming behavior, which implies
making a decision, as it is the case for other social insurance programs. This decision is
worth being investigated as people do not claim as soon as they are eligible, as an in-
evitability, but may weigh the pros and cons of claiming early (i.e. before the normal age
of Social Security take-up). By doing so they forgo large beneﬁt accruals that could be
paid to them and their spouses until their deaths, but on the other hand enjoy retirement
beneﬁts for more years and without waiting any longer. For example, a boomer with
a ﬁnal annual salary of $75,000 might receive a $1,388 monthly Social Security check if
he collects at age 62; if the same boomer were to delay until age 66, he would get $1,917
monthly. Yet, most individuals apply for Social Security beneﬁts early: according to the
Social Security Administration data for the year 2010, 74% of current recipients receive
reduced beneﬁts because they started their beneﬁts prior to their Full Retirement Age.
That already-retired individuals claim their retirement beneﬁts as soon as possible is not
so surprising as the latter have already left the labor force and are waiting for their eligi-
bility to claim their SS beneﬁts. On the contrary, the existence of a group of individuals
within the labor force who claim beneﬁts as soon as possible, before they withdraw from
the labor market, is quite puzzling. This group is made of workers and unemployed indi-
viduals. There are various reasons why workers may claim Social Security (SS) beneﬁts
while continuing to work, resorting to the insurance function of Social Security (SS) ben-
eﬁts. Indeed, workers may want to initiate the payment of their SS beneﬁts in the case
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that they need a new source of income very urgently, for instance if they fear that they
could lose their job. Besides, there is a widespread concern among US citizens that a
new legislation in terms of SS entitlements might make them worse oﬀ, so that claiming
as soon as possible would allow them to secure their monthly retirement beneﬁts. On
the other hand for the unemployed, claiming while not retiring means claiming and con-
tinuing to look for a job. As these individuals have no earnings from work, claiming as
soon as they become eligible for SS beneﬁts might be their best option, particularly if
they run short of liquidity. Nevertheless, the fact that they do not retire when they claim
implies that they have not given up on work, and will keep on searching. My hypothesis
is that older unemployed individuals lacking liquidity use Social Security beneﬁts as a
safety net in order to ﬁnance consumption during an unemployment episode. In this way,
Social Security might be thought as a form of unemployment insurance which would allow
them to maintain their standard of living during their job search. The purpose of this
paper is hence to ﬁnd empirical evidence about the potential insurance function of Social
Security beneﬁts, which would provide support for integrating Unemployment Insurance
with Retirement Insurance.
I present estimates of the probability of claiming Social Security beneﬁts in a duration
model framework, along with estimates of the impact of being unemployed and lacking
liquidity on early claiming in a probability model. I ﬁnd empirical evidence of higher
odds of claiming early SS beneﬁts by unemployed individuals and more generally those
at the very bottom of the distribution of total household income. More importantly,
the interaction between low income and labor force status is highly signiﬁcant, which
implies that it is necessary to go beyond the income explanation when dealing with
early claiming. The need for income does trigger early claiming-this can be seen in the
coeﬃcients of the income quartile variables- but the unemployed seem to have other
incentives to claim since they do it more than the workers in the same quartile of income.
As they mainly diﬀer from their working counterparts in that they are looking for a job
instead of working (because I contro for a wide range of individual characteristics), it
seems quite straightforward to give a UI meaning to these SS retirement beneﬁts. A a
result, claiming early SS beneﬁts culd actually lead these unemployed individuals to stay
longer in the labor market by increasing their chance of ﬁnding a new job.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing So-
cial Security literature, Section 3 describes relevant institutional features of the American
Social Security system that will be necessary to understand the Social Security claiming
pattern and motivates the purpose of the current study. Section 4 describes the data
and the econometric models I estimate. Section 5 displays the empirical results of the




The retirement literature is outstandingly rich. Most studies have focused on studying
the eﬀects of Social Security on labor supply and wealth accumulation. Some of them
use aggregate data to reveal the impact of Social Security by examining the labor force
behavior of older workers at diﬀerent ages. Hurd [1990] and Ruhm [1995] ﬁnd a spike in
the age pattern of retirement at age 62 and show that this peak has grown over time as
Social Security beneﬁts have increased; besides, Burtless and Moﬃtt [1984] show evidence
that this peak did not exist before claiming at 62 became possible. Another peak at age
65 may be the result of an unfair actuarial scheme that discourages working beyond age
65. Blau [1994] shows empirically the existence of this peak since nearly 25% of the men
in the labor force on their 65th birthday retire in the next quarter in his data, which is
2.5 times more than the hazard rate of the surrounding quarters. In the same vein, other
related literature has approached the issue by estimating structural models of retirement
(Rust and Phelan [1997]; Gustman and Steinmeier [2002]; French [2005] to name some
of the most recent research eﬀorts). All these studies examine the labor force behavior
of older workers and more precisely the timing of withdrawal from the labor force for
older workers. The last paper tries to replicate the spikes in retirement activity at ages
62 and 65 by introducing heterogeneity in taste for leisure and the discount rate, as the
ﬁrst spike has no other rational explanation, contrary to the traditional bunch at age
65 (declining beneﬁt accrual proﬁle). Thus these models aim at understanding early
retirement behavior as a function of Social Security rules.
Another strand of the literature uses micro-data sets with information on potential
Social Security beneﬁt determinants or ex-post beneﬁt levels to measure the incentives to
claim across individuals in the data. To do so, several sophisticated measures of Social
Security incentives have been computed: ﬁrst, Social Security Wealth (SSW) as present
discounted value of future Social Security entitlements; then, retirement models have
included functions of SSW accruals in the case of additional years of work. Stock and
Wise [1990] introduce another forward-looking measure, namely the option value, which
contrasts the utility of retiring today versus at some optimal date in the future. Coile and
Gruber [2004] improve the latter measure with the peak value, deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between SSW at its maximum expected value and SSW at today's value. As such, the peak
value incorporates the insights of the option value measure and appropriately considers
the trade-oﬀ between retiring today and working until a period with much higher SSW,
but focuses solely on variation in Social Security incentives, rather than variation in
earnings. Although most of this literature concludes that Social Security has large eﬀects
upon retirement, these eﬀects appear very small compared to the time trend in male
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retirement over the past 50 years.
2.2 Social Security Claiming Behavior
As pointed out in Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten [2002], this literature suﬀers from
a potential weakness consisting of the endogeneity of the timing of Social Security beneﬁts
claiming and therefore of the beneﬁts level. Indeed, using actual Social Security beneﬁts
as the key independent variable to explain the Social Security take-up decision instead of
using Primary Insurance Amounts (PIAs) must produce biased estimations of the impact
of Social Security upon retirement since Social Security beneﬁts are themselves a function
of the timing of Social Security claiming. As I do not have access to restricted data, PIAs
are not available in the dataset I use for this analysis, but I do not use Social Security
beneﬁts level either because of the endogeneity issue raised before.
The existing literature is also deﬁcient in assuming most of the time that retirement
and claiming are one unique decision. Thus, there may be some mismeasurement of the
key regressor (the accrual rate of social security wealth for instance) since claiming can
be delayed after retirement. In other words, if claiming is distinct from retirement as
cessation of work, then it limits the impact of additional work on SSW accruals; the
major impact stems from delayed claiming, and studies focusing on that of additional
work may miss an essential piece of the retirement timing puzzle.
However, a few papers do analyze the Social Security claiming and the retirement
decisions independently. First, Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten [2002] examine
the claiming behavior of single and married men who have retired before age 62, and
are unable to claim beneﬁts upon retirement. They consider the age of claiming as a
purely ﬁnancial decision, separate from their decision to retire. Using data from the
Social Security Administration's New Beneﬁciary Data System (NBDS), they ﬁnd that
most men in their sample claim as soon as they become eligible, or soon thereafter. Yet
a substantial minority, whose characteristics imply greater Expected Present Value of
Beneﬁts (EPVB) if they delayed, does so. Household wealth is identiﬁed to inﬂuence
the age of claiming, as both tails of the wealth distribution are more likely to claim
early, suggesting impatience and/or liquidity constraints at low wealth levels, and strong
bequest motives at high wealth levels. Finally, even when controlling for this inverse
U-shape, households appear to leave signiﬁcant amounts of SSW on the table.
Second, Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos [2003] analyze the Social Security take-up
decision as an independent decision, using the ﬁrst four waves of the Health and Retire-
ment Study (HRS). The only variable they identify to explain claiming ages is subjective
mortality beliefs, with little explanatory power. Again, they ﬁnd that most households
do not maximize their SSW, claiming too early. Sass, Sun, and Webb [2007] follow the
same approach in order to investigate the reason why married men claim Social Security
5
beneﬁts so early. Limiting their sample to households who retired prior to becoming el-
igible to claim Social Security beneﬁts, they ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant relationship
between the age of claiming and either household wealth, or expected longevity.
The claiming of retirement beneﬁts by non-retired individuals who stay in the labor
force after claiming has received considerably less attention. Most of the literature inves-
tigating the decision to claim in that context has focused on the taxation aspects of the
earnings test (Burtless and Moﬃtt [1985]; Honig and Reimers [1989]; Baker and Benjamin
[1999]; Friedberg [1998, 2000]; Votruba [2003]). In other words, it addresses the issue of
the incentives or disincentives to continue working after claiming that are provided by
the earnings test. Last, Benitez-Silva and Heiland [2005] make a fruitful attempt to ﬁll
the gap due to the relatively little research on the labor supply and the claiming behavior
of early retirees, by jointly modeling labor supply and claiming decisions in a duration
analysis framework. Their study is even more innovative in that they examine the small
proportion of early claimers who do not withdraw from the labor force at the time of
claiming, and shows that they in fact exit the labor force later than their counterparts
who claim beneﬁts later, because they have a greater incentive than later claimants to
continue to work and earn above the earnings limit to increase their eﬀective beneﬁt rate
when they retire after reaching their NRA1. Though inspiring for the issue I am dealing
with, this paper focuses on workers and the impact of the complex rules of the earnings
test on labor force withdrawal, whereas I am committed to examining the claiming pat-
tern of the unemployed, and ﬁnding evidence of the role of SS beneﬁts in ﬁnancing the job
search process of these unemployed individuals. In addition, Benitez-Silva and Heiland
[2005] look at claiming and retirement patterns between age 62 and age 65 because the
earnings test only applies between those ages. I investigate early claiming too, because
age 62 is the ﬁrst opportunity for unemployed individuals to claim and use SS as a form
of unemployment insurance, but the question that I raise still applies to longer delays.
The unemployed may use SS beneﬁts to ﬁnance their consumption while searching at any
age, but few will delay past the Normal Retirement Age.
2.3 Unemployment annd Retirement Beneﬁts
The relationship between unemployment and Social Security claiming has been at the
core of many papers abroad, and some in the US. Hutchens and Jacobson [2002] look
at the distribution of ages at which people receive unemployment insurance (UI), before
and after the law forbidding receiving both UI and SS at the same time. Spikes at the
1As will be stated in the next section, there is a permanent reduction of the monthly beneﬁt amount
when beneﬁts are claimed before the NRA. Actually, this reduction may not be permanent as there is a
possibility to reduce the penalty after initiating the receipt of beneﬁts if the claimant continues to work
or re-enters the labor market, and earns more than the ceiling of the earnings test (so that his receipt of
beneﬁts is suspended) until the NRA.
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ages of 62 and 65, which are the conventional retirement ages, tend to underline a
relationship between SS and UI. In other countries, the issue of a possible link between
unemployment at older ages and transitions to retirement has been dealt with more
deeply. Hallberg [2006] ﬁnds that the probability that a worker takes early retirement in
Sweden depends on deviations in aggregate employment in his industry from the long-
run trend. Other researchers have found that many older workers spend some time living
on UI immediately before they claim SS beneﬁts. In Sweden only 7 per cent of older
workers are in this situation according to Palme and Svensson [2004], but there are 15
per cent in Belgium (see Dellis, Desmet, Jousten, and Perelman [2004]), over 20 per cent in
France and Germany (see Mahieu and Blanchet [2004]; Borsch-Supan, Schnabel, Kohnz,
and Mastrobuoni [2004]), and almost 40 per cent in Japan (see Oshio and Oishi [2004]),
where applying for UI is considered to be normal for anyone losing his job, whether he
looks for another job or not. Thus in all these countries, and many others, unemployment
insurance is often used as a kind of early retirement beneﬁt while awaiting legal social
security beneﬁts.
In this paper I show the other way around, i.e. that the unemployed may use SS
retirement beneﬁts as a kind of Unemployment Insurance that would help them looking
for a job. The fact that they are not exiting the labor force when they claim their
SS beneﬁts implies that these individuals are not just waiting for their eligibility to SS
beneﬁts to retire, but that they are willing to back to work and hence this new source of
income could help them in their job search process.
According to Coile and Levine [2006],
While SS is traditionally thought of as a source of support for retired and
disabled workers, it may serve as an additional source of support for older
workers who lose their jobs. If an older unemployed worker is struggling
ﬁnancially, he may be forced to start collecting beneﬁts to make ends meet.
Although one does not necessarily need to retire to collect these beneﬁts,
beneﬁt receipt is typically linked to retirement. In terms of providing income
support to older unemployed workers, SS may be thought of as an alternative
form of unemployment insurance.
In line with this study, I intend to pinpoint the social insurance role of SS beneﬁts for the
unemployed. I will therefore underline the role of being unemployed -once the impact of
income is controlled for- in the decision to claim, and show that a substantial proportion
of unemployed individuals at the bottom of the income distribution choose to claim early
SS beneﬁts without withdrawing from the labor market, which suggests that they do so
because they need the cash but want to remain within the labor force.
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3 Institutional Features and Motivation
3.1 Institutional Features of the Social Security System
A brief overview of the US Social Security system is required to understand the motivation
for this analysis. First, Social Security retirement beneﬁts earned by reason of one's own
contributions can be claimed at any age from 62 to 70, subject to an earnings test that
has become less stringent over time. The calculation of beneﬁts involves four steps. First,
a worker's previous earnings are restated in terms of today's wages by indexing past
earnings to wage growth. Second, earnings for the highest 35 years are averaged and
divided by 12 to calculate his Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). Third, the
Social Security beneﬁt formula is applied to AIME to produce the Primary Insurance
Amount (PIA), the beneﬁt payable at the Full Retirement Age (FRA). Finally, beneﬁts
are adjusted to produce permanently lower or higher beneﬁts for those who claim before
or after the FRA, so that the system is roughly actuarially neutral (see Section 7.1 in the
appendix for further detail).
The FRA is not a static concept: it has been 65 for many years; however, beginning
with people born in 1938 or later, that age gradually increases until age 67 for people born
after 1959. One of the speciﬁcities of the US Social Security system is that retirement need
not be concurrent with claiming. Ceasing work is not required, though Social Security
takers are subjected to an earnings test: if their earnings exceed a certain amount, beneﬁts
are reduced by $1 for each $3 earned before the FRA2. Above the FRA, the earnings test
has been eliminated since 2000.
3.2 Motivation and Hypothesis
The SS claiming decision may be quite complex. Indeed, because the SS system is roughly
neutral for an average individual (with the average life expectancy), there is much room
for decision making. Older individuals nearing eligibility for retirement beneﬁts are so
confused about what they should or shouldn't do that some private insurance companies
have made a business out of it. Figure 1 is an example of on-line counselling provided by
Metlife (Metropolitan Life Insurance Company). When should I retire? Should I take
Social Security beneﬁts right away? How do I make the most of what I have? In just
three quick steps, the Social Security decision tool will help explain why delaying your
beneﬁts could potentially increase the amount of money you collect over your lifetime.
Taking the three quick steps (how old are you?, are you a male or a female?, how
much did you earn last year, or the last full year you worked?) results in that ﬁgure.
What kind of information does the SS decision tool provide? Assuming that I am a 61
2This amount has been increased over years, from $9,120 of annual earnings in 1998, to $37,680 today.
8
year-old male whose last annual earnings amounted to $75,000, my monthly beneﬁts will
be $1,388 if I claim at age 62, compared to $1,917 if I postpone until the full retirement
age of 66. As I have a 70% chance of living past age 76, which is my break-even age3, I
should probably delay the claiming of my beneﬁts. Indeed, if I do so, by age 85 (which
I will reach with a 50% probability) I will have accumulated $53,988 more; by age 92
(which I will outlive with a 25% probability) this ﬁgure goes up to $98,424. Therefore,
any individual is advised to delay the claiming of his beneﬁts unless he expects to die
before his break-even age. In other words, If you don't need the income to support your
lifestyle from age 62 to 66, it's often best to wait.
Figure 1: The Social Security claiming decision: a puzzle
Conversely, if you are unemployed at age 61, and you do not have enough available
wealth to maintain your standard of living while you are looking for a job, claiming Social
Security can barely be considered as a choice-based decision. Furthermore, liquidity-
constrained individuals are likely to have a much stronger preference for the present, and
thus higher discount rates (all the more since their life expectancy is lower), so that they
will pay more attention to the present ﬂow of SS beneﬁts than to the loss of future higher
3the break-even age is the point at which the cumulative value of early retirement beneﬁts is trumped
by the money that would have been paid to the claimant had he waited until his full retirement age.
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beneﬁts. As a result these individuals - unemployed and/or lacking liquidity - will have
incentives to claim early beneﬁts. Besides, borrowing against future SS beneﬁts is not
allowed, so that they may need to resort to early SS beneﬁts in order to ﬁnance their
consumption, even if they are not willing to retire.
The same goes for part-time workers, since their salary may be low enough to make
claiming more valuable to them than delaying. Besides, contrary to full-time workers,
they are very likely to earn less than the ceiling of the earnings test and therefore they
increase their total income by claiming and continuing to work at the same time without
paying additional taxes. Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten [2002] show that, among
those who are eligible for full beneﬁts under the existing earnings test, the rate of claiming
is very high. In particular, among those who have earnings at their 62nd birthday below
the earnings test level, roughly 90% claim within a year of turning 62. Among those
whose earnings drop below this level after their 62nd birthday, claiming is even higher,
with essentially no one who retires from age 65 onwards delaying claiming. Thus, I do
not expect wealth and income to impact the decision to claim by the unemployed more
than that of the part-time workers, but the intuition behind the two patterns is diﬀerent.
Although it is optimal for a wide class of preference parameters to delay claiming
beyond the date of initial beneﬁts entitlement (see Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten
[2002]), there are several reasons why older individuals could prefer to claim early. First,
they may not understand the functioning of the actuarial adjustment and more precisely
how beneﬁts are increased to compensate for forgone beneﬁts when claiming is delayed.
Secondly, individuals may be myopic, in that they claim early due to high short-run
discount rates, but regret this decision later due to a lower long-run discount rate, hence
behaving in a time-inconsistent manner. Diamond and Koszegi [2003] speak of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting.
As mentioned before, the rationale for claiming early while not withdrawing from the
labor force may be more speciﬁc. Some workers might ﬁle for SS beneﬁts just in case they
lose their job in order to secure a new source of income (which can be received at the
same time as unemployment insurance). Indeed, processing the inital SS claim takes up
to 3 months, which reduces to 6 weeks if the initial claim has already occurred before, and
was then suspended. Hence, workers whose job is insecure, or whose level of risk-aversion
is particularly high, may claim SS beneﬁts and continue working. Another popular belief
about SS is that a bird in the hand is better than two in the bush. In other words,
you'd better hurry up to claim SS beneﬁts as long as the SS system is guaranteed by the
government.
My hypothesis is that there may be another explanation - which is particular to
the unemployed - for claiming early while staying in the labor force. Social Security
might be thought of as an alternative form of unemployment insurance. The existence
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of a relationship between unemployment and retirement has already been put forward
in previous studies (Hutchens and Jacobson [2002] and Coile and Levine [2006]). But
these ﬁndings only dealt with claiming when coupled with retirement. Put diﬀerently,
unemployment induces older workers to retire in order to collect SS beneﬁts. The question
that I raise here is diﬀerent in that I study the impact of unemployment on claiming while
staying in the labor force, i.e. continuing to look for a job. I expect to ﬁnd some evidence
of the impact of unemployment combined with low total income on early claiming, in
order to prove that there is a group of unemployed individuals who do not want to retire,
and use SS beneﬁts as a ﬁnancial means to carry through their job search. In other words,
these early claimers borrow from their pensions in order to ease the burden of a reduction
in their lifetime income and spread it more eﬀectively over a longer working life as these
beneﬁts allow them to keep looking for a job and stay longer on the labor market. One
way to validate this interpretation would be to study the time these unemployed early
claimers take to exit the labor force compared to the other unemployed who do not
claim early, and check whether early claimers exit the labor force more slowly than their
counterparts. One problem is that older unemployed individuals are quite scarce once the
age of SS eligibility has been reached, which makes it hard to compare the exit patterns
of these two groups.
4 Data
4.1 Data Description
This study exploits data from both the original HRS and version I of the data prepared by
RAND. The RAND HRS data is a cleaned and processed version containing many vari-
ables from HRS, for about ﬁve cohorts, during eight waves separated by one or two years,
from 1992 until 2006. The HRS is the best available database for exploring retirement
issues in the US as it is a mine of information concerning health, wealth, demographics,
respondents' expectations and projects concerning retirement, etc. However, its biennal
structure makes it possible to observe transitions from one state (e.g. work or unem-
ployment) to another (e.g. retirement), but hard to study their determinants, as most
variables are only measured at the time of the interview, i.e. every other year. Most
importantly, it oﬀers enough information (particularly the exact date of SS take-up) to
allow a survival analysis of claiming delays, which might be the best tool to analyze Social
Security claiming behavior.
In all the following empirical analyses, the sample is composed of individuals (male
and female) who are part of the labor force, as workers or unemployed; partly-retired4
4An individual is classiﬁed as partly retired if he is working but still mentions a retirement status or
if he mentions being retired while looking for a job.
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individuals are discarded as their status is hybrid between workers and job searchers. I
exclude those who have ever applied for disability beneﬁts because disability is a separate
pathway to retirement that is subject to its own particular rules (this is quite common
an assumption in the previously cited literature). Last, I only consider those who are or
will become eligible for SS beneﬁts at the next wave, i.e. individuals having a 10-year job
history at least, and who are or will be 62 enough 5 to claim their beneﬁts by the next
wave. Finally, as spouses and survivors have the right to become entitled to special Social
Security beneﬁts before age 62 (from age 60 for spouses and without any age restriction
for orphans), those who claimed their beneﬁts before age 62 are not part of this study.
I estimate two econometric models to address one question. The ﬁrst one is a duration
model that investigates time-to-claiming. Therefore, individuals live/survive from the
moment they become eligible for early Social Security beneﬁts, i.e. age 62, until they
claim Social Security beneﬁts. Observed spells start the month prior to the 62nd birthday,
so that a duration of 13 months, for instance, would mean claiming at age 63. As birth and
Social Security take-up dates are available in the HRS, the exact duration is known, even
though Social Security take-up may occur between two waves. The resulting sample is
made of 7,221 observations, representing 4,603 subjects aged between 60 and 70, amongst
whom 3,445 failed over the observation period, the others being right-censored (they do
not undergo the event during their observation period).
The second econometric model is a cross-sectional analysis of the joint probability of
claiming SS beneﬁts and retiring between the waves before and after the 62nd birthday.
Contrary to the duration analysis, which focuses on one event, this cross-sectional analysis
considers simultaneously the possibility of claiming and retiring. By doing this I will be
able to derive predictions of the probability of claiming and not retiring. The sample is
restricted following the same rules as in the survival analysis, except that individuals are
only observed before and after their 62nd birthday. It thus consists of 3,879 observations,
representing this time 3,879 individuals. Both models estimate the determinants of the
claiming decision, but the cross-sectional probability model emphasizes early claiming (at
age 62) while the duration model is the most natural framework for analyzing claiming
delays from the month respondents become eligible until their failure or exit from the
sample.
5Workers are not instantly eligible for Social Security retirement beneﬁts on their 62nd birthdays, nor
can they receive beneﬁts in the month they turn 62. I follow the methodology described in Olson [2000]
in order to correctly approximate the pool of HRS respondents who are old enough to have reported the
receipt of their ﬁrst retirement beneﬁt.
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics
As shown in Table 2, I use a comprehensive set of control variables that includes gender,
marital status, education, the number of people in the household, health (whether health
status limits the ability to work, whether the individual rates his health status as excel-
lent), self-expectations of mortality (whether the individual believes he has more than a
50% chance of living until age 75), whether the respondent receives some private pension
income, job history (the number of years worked), and total household wealth, which
is displayed as a continuous variable in Table 2 but will be included as quartiles in the
regressions. The key variables of the analyses are labor force status, divided into full-time
workers, part-time workers, and the unemployed, along with total household income. Net
total household wealth is deﬁned as the sum of housing wealth (primary and secondary
residences less mortgages) and ﬁnancial wealth (ﬁnancial assets as well as liquid savings)
less all debts. The only component that is not included in that global measure of wealth
is Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA). Total household income includes earnings from
work, household capital income, income from employer pension or annuity, unemployment
insurance or worker's compensation, other government transfers (veteran's beneﬁts, food
stamps, etc.), and other household income such as alimony or lump sums from insurance,
pension or inheritance. As some of these covariates are time-varying and data are discrete,
they are assigned their value from the closest previous survey wave.
Although the sample size of the duration analysis is bigger than that of the cross-
sectional one, because there are several observations per individual, the means and stan-
dard deviations of the covariates are very similar. The sample is roughly divided into
84% full-time workers, 14% part-time workers, and 2% unemployed individuals. There
are few unemployed at older ages because most of them stopped looking for work and
therefore became self-reported retirees, which makes it diﬃcult to analyze the claiming
behavior of the unemployed in a subsample. Hence, I consider the whole labor force
sample, and use labor force status as a key explanatory variable rather than to construct
distinct subsamples.
Tables 3 and 4 show descriptive evidence of a speciﬁc claiming pattern of the un-
employed. The frequency distributions of the time-to-claiming spells are displayed in
Table 3. These are not survival times, since some of the subjects are censored (25%).
As expected, the unemployed have shorter spells (18 months on average) than part-time
workers (32 months), and full-time workers (27 months). Half of the unemployed claim
within 8 months after turning 62, while the median spells are 17 months for part-time
workers and 25 months for full-time workers. Put diﬀerently, more than 60 per cent of the
unemployed claim as soon as possible (i.e. between the waves before and after turning 62,
see Table 4), compared to 57 per cent of part-time workers and 36 per cent of full-time
workers.
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A clear pattern also emerges from these statistics for household income quartiles.
Indeed, bottom quartiles are associated with shorter spells (very clear for median dura-
tions), and higher probabilities of claiming early. As for household wealth, it seems too
that the left tail of the distribution exits sooner, but the picture is more fuzzy.
4.3 Non-Parametric Analysis
Though unconditional, non-parametric analysis allows us to learn from the data without
making any assumption about the distribution of time to failure, nor about the form that
the eﬀects of the covariates will take.
Figure 2 in the appendix plots the survivor function estimated by the Kaplan-Meier
method. The survivor function shows a highly irregular pattern of claiming: ﬁrst the
slopes of the step function, or the height of the steps, are higher at round ages, as
people are always more prone to make transitions at round ages. Second, these higher
slopes, which correspond to spikes in Social Security beneﬁt take-up, are not all of the
same magnitude: the two highest steps correspond to the early and normal retirement
ages (62 and 65, more precisely the ﬁrst 3 months following 62, and the 2 months following
65); other spikes are observable at ages 63 and 64, but of lesser magnitude; there seems
to be another spike of high magnitude around 48 months, due to the shift of the NRA
(normal retirement age) from age 65 to age 66. Trying to estimate the slope of the
integrated hazard function at each of the observed survival time is quite tricky as it is
equivalent to trying to ﬁnd the slope at the corner of each of the steps. Clearly the slope
cannot be well-deﬁned, nor is any non-parametric estimate of the hazard rate. Figure
3 in the appendix shows the hazard contribution obtained by deriving estimates of the
interval hazard rate. The second spike (at age 65) seems greater than the ﬁrst one because
these are hazard rate estimates, not claiming propensions. The hazard rate of claiming
can be deﬁned as a conditional probability. For example, the hazard rate of claiming at
age 63 is the probability of claiming at age 63 conditional on not having claimed until
that age. Hence even though more people claim at age 62 than at age 65, the hazard rate
is much higher at 65 because the number of individuals failing is divided by the number
of individuals at risk at each survival time, and the latter number strictly decreases with
time.
Figures 4 and 5 conﬁrm what descriptive statistics suggest, while oﬀering greater
details. The unemployed fail sooner than workers, and the diﬀerence in their survivals
comes mainly from the ﬁrst three months after turning 62: at age 62 and three months
almost 50 per cent of the unemployed have already claimed, compared to less than 30
per cent of part-time workers and much less for full-time workers. So it seems that
unemployment induces older individuals to claim as soon as possible. Later than 62,
there is another big rush into claiming at age 63 for the unemployed, so that the gap
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with those who are still working keeps on widening, and few unemployed individuals
remain in the risk pool after age 63.
Kaplan-Meier estimates by wealth and income quartiles are good representations of
the patterns described above: the more income individuals have, the later they claim; the
picture is less clear for wealth, except for people in the top quartile, whose survival curve
is much higher than the other three, meaning that only the very wealthy claim later.
4.4 A Few Caveats
Before going further with the econometric analysis, there are a few traditional issues that
I would like to mention as being knowingly ignored in this study. When dealing with
claiming and retirement and the eﬀect of claiming on retirement and vice-versa, endo-
geneity concerns are quite common. Indeed, studying the inﬂuence of having claimed on
the labor force exit decision might entail some diﬃculties as claiming behavior is poten-
tially endogenous to retirement behavior, if individuals consider whether to claim or delay
when choosing their retirement date. I cannot solve this concern in the duration analysis,
but the bivariate analysis allows me to study the two outcomes simultaneously, and thus
to identify the determinants of people claiming and staying in the labor force. Therefore,
the two models bring their own contribution to explaining the SS claiming decision. On
the one hand the duration model oﬀers a comprehensive understanding of the timing of
SS claiming, and of the impact of covariates on claiming hazards. On the other hand the
bivariate probit allows the calculation of the joint probabilities of two non-independent
events, i.e. claiming and retiring, before and after the 62nd birthday, and hence the
possibility of checking the impact of covariates on the probability of claiming early while
staying in the labor force. Another point to mention is the number of covariates, which
I restrict on purpose. Indeed, this study focuses on the unemployed, while most of the
variables that are available in the HRS are speciﬁc to retirees or workers (earnings, num-
ber of hours, type of occupation, health impairments due to the job, etc.). Therefore I
consider that all job characteristics are contained in the labor status variables, which is
not an issue when the core of the study lies in the behavior of the jobless as opposed to
workers.
Finally, there is a reason for which many studies consider the implications of the earn-
ings test when studying the determinants of SS beneﬁts receipt. Some bring evidence
of the existence of a relationship between the earnings test and SS claiming behavior.
Disney and Tanner [2000] in their study of the removal of the earnings test in the UK
show that lifting the earnings test can lead to more claiming of beneﬁts by those already
working. Gruber and Orszag [2000] ﬁnd that loosening the earnings test leads to in-
creased beneﬁts recipiency. Their estimates indicate that a $1,000 rise in the earnings
test threshold would increase the share of the elderly receiving Social Security beneﬁts
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by 0.69 to 1.59 percent, and that complete removal would increase that share by 5.2 to
13.5 percent. These large eﬀects are consistent with evidence from the removal of the
earnings test in Canada shown in Baker and Benjamin [1999]. Thus, completely ignor-
ing the incentives and disincentives to claim provided by the earnings test would be a
mistake. As any person retiring before NRA is potentially subject to an earnings test
when claiming social security beneﬁts, both individuals' current income and expectation
of prospective income are crucial variables in determining their decision to claim. For
example, if you are unemployed and expect to remain unemployed, then you may as well
claim social security beneﬁts as early as possible in order to secure that source of income.
Conversely if you are temporarily unemployed but expect to return to full-time work, then
this strategy might not be so attractive. Unemployed and low-hours workers may well use
social security as some sort of social insurance but these earnings-test related incentives
could be important also; hence the need to diﬀerentiate between the two hypotheses. One
way of overcoming this issue would consist in using individuals' subjective probability of
continuing full-time work after age 62 (and 65). This measure has been well documented
in, e.g., Hurd [1999], Chan and Stevens [2004] and Michaud and van Soest [2007]. It
refers to the question: "Thinking about work generally and not just your present job,
what do you think are the chances that you will be working full time after you reach age
62?". A similar question is asked with respect to the chances of continuing work after age
65. Unfortunately, this question is only asked to employed individuals, so that it cannot
be introduced as an additional explanatory variable along with labor status variables.
It could, howver, be used as some kind of check of the insurance role of SS beneﬁts for
workers. Leaving aside the unemployed, if workers from the bottom income quartiles have
higher odds of claiming early and retiring later, including when their expectations about
if they will continue full-time work after the earliest age of eligibility are controlled for,
then the assumption that they claim early because they need an alternative source of
income is no longer challenged by that of the earnings test disincentives to claim early
if one expects to return to full-time employment. Thus I will perform some sensitivity
checks consisting of adding these expectations into the set of covariates (see section 5.5).
5 Econometric Methods and Results
5.1 Survival Analysis of the Claiming Decision
To empirically assess the inﬂuence of being unemployed and without enough resources to
pull through, I estimate hazard models of SS claiming. I expect to ﬁnd a speciﬁc claiming
pattern for the unemployed and more generally for those lacking liquidity. My empirical
strategy consists of specifying only a functional form for the inﬂuence of covariates while
leaving the shape of the transition rates as unspeciﬁed as possible. In other words, the
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model to be estimated is a semiparametric Cox model. The hazard rate for the jth subject
in the data is :
h(t|Xj) = h0(t)exp(Xjβx) (1)
The transition rate, h(t), is the product of an unspeciﬁed baseline rate, h0, and a sec-
ond term specifying the possible inﬂuences of a covariate vector Xj on the transition
rate. This is a special case of so-called proportional transition rate models because the
eﬀects of covariates can only induce proportional shifts in the transition rate but cannot
change its shape. First, a global test of this assumption, based on Schoenfeld residuals,
leads us to reject the null hypothesis of a log-hazard ratio that is constant over time.
Then, I implement graphical methods on the variables that cause the rejection of the
PH assumption (see Figure 6): by plotting the transformation −ln(−ln(S(t))) for the
two survivor curves corresponding to the employed and the unemployed (S(t) being the
survivor function) against ln(t) on the x axis, I ﬁnd no clear-cut evidence in favor of
or against the proportional hazard assumption. Indeed the two curves, which should be
parallel for the assumption to be veriﬁed, end up crossing, but only after a long period
of survival, around 50 months. So there seems to be a rank inversion for some of the
covariates tested, when the curve representing the highest survival crosses the other curve
and then stays below. Actually, this result is not surprising as the slope of the highest
survival curve might become greater than that of the lowest at the point where the risk
pool of the less surviving group becomes too small. Here, workers survive better than the
unemployed (i.e. they claim later) but their survival curves are almost perfectly parallel,
until that of the working group crosses that of the unemployed, because the at-risk pool
of unemployed individuals has become too small since most of them have already failed.
This is a pure mechanical eﬀect, which occurs after long enough delays not to bother the
implementation of the Cox model. Another way of checking the PH assumption consists
of comparing separately estimated Kaplan-Meier curves (which are model agnostic) with
estimates of the survivor function from a Cox model, which does impose the PH assump-
tion. However, this method does not allow other covariates to be introduced. Figure 7
shows that what Cox estimations miss with the PH assumption is the very strong eﬀect
of being unemployed within the ﬁrst 12 months or so. Actually, assuming the hazards are
proportional leads to smoothing the eﬀect of the variable over the survival time. If the
focus of the study is not the timing of the eﬀect of the covariates but the very eﬀect of
the variable, then the PH assumption may be considered veriﬁed. Hence in the following
I investigate the impact of every covariate on durations considering that this eﬀect is
constant over time. Nevertheless it is useful to keep in mind that the impact of labor
force status, as well as that of income (since these variables are those which are suspected
not to hold the PH assumption), is much stronger on short durations.
In alternative speciﬁcations, I include in the set of control variables labor force status
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alone, income quartiles alone, both, and ﬁnally interactions between labor force status and
income quartiles. If the unemployed have a particular pattern of claiming relative to their
total income, I expect these interactions (or only some of them) to impact signiﬁcantly
the claiming hazard.
Such interaction eﬀects should be handled with particular care. Indeed there has been
much discussion on how to interpret these in non-linear models (Ai and Norton [2003];
Norton, Wang, and Ai [2004]; Cornelissen and Sonderhof [2009]). These authors point out
a common mistake, which consists of interpreting the ﬁrst derivative of the multiplicative
term between two explanatory variables as the interaction eﬀect.
This concern can be addressed by several methods, depending on the model estimated.
For the Cox model, I present hazard ratios rather than marginal eﬀects. As stated in Buis
[2010],
fortunately, we can interpret interactions without referring to any additional
program by presenting eﬀects as multiplicative eﬀects (e.g. odds ratios, incidence-
rate ratios, hazard ratios). However, the marginal eﬀects and multiplicative
eﬀects answer subtly diﬀerent questions, and thus it is a good idea to have
both tools in your toolbox.
Hence for the Cox results, I display both multiplicative and marginal eﬀects as will be
explained below. For the bivariate probit on the other hand, displaying results as multi-
plicative eﬀects is not possible, so I will resort to predicted probabilities and their ratios
to interpret the eﬀects of these interactions.
5.2 Empirical Results for Cox Analysis
Tables 5 and 6 present the hazard ratios of the covariates for the Cox estimations. All
speciﬁcations include the basic set of socio-economic explanatory variables, along with
controls for the survey waves and census divisions in order to make sure that no phe-
nomenon speciﬁc to one year or region could inﬂuence the claiming decision in some
way.
The ﬁrst and third columns of Table 5 conﬁrm the hierarchy between labor force
statuses observed in the descriptive analysis: the unemployed are more likely to claim than
part-time workers, and much more likely to claim than full-time workers (the unemployed
face a 62% greater hazard than full-time workers, and the odds of claiming are 42%
higher for part-time workers than full-time workers). Income quartiles also conﬁrm the
monotonic impact that was observed in the descriptive section (see columns (2) and (3)),
i.e. the more income older individuals have, the less likely they are to claim. The fact that
the coeﬃcients of labor force statuses remain almost unaltered when income is controlled
for implies that the higher odds of claiming for the unemployed, and to a lesser extent for
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part-timers, do not entirely depend on the lack of income. In order to understand if lack
of income drives the behavior of part-time workers and the unemployed, I decompose
the eﬀect of labor force status on claiming hazard by income quartiles. For brevity,
Table 6 only presents results for the parameters of interest, i.e. the interactions between
labor force status and household income quartiles. The ﬁrst column of results displays
multiplicative eﬀects, which have to be compared to the baseline hazard. As the latter is
obtained by ﬁxing all covariates at zero, the reference category here is working full-time
interacted with ﬁrst quartile of income (ﬁrst line).
The unemployed and the part-timers at the bottom of the distribution of total house-
hold income (in the 1st quartile) have higher odds of claiming than most of the other
groups in the sample, which is consistent with my hypothesis of a strong interaction be-
tween labor force status and a lack of liquidity being a trigger to claim early SS beneﬁts.
As a proportional hazard model, the Cox model does not allow me to see if this eﬀect
is stronger at the beginning or toward the end of the spell, because the eﬀect of the co-
variates is not time-dependent, but descriptive evidence found earlier suggests that the
eﬀect must be maximum over short durations. Being unemployed also raises the odds of
claiming for the top quartile. Hence, it seems that the unemployed have higher incentives
to claim when they are short of liquidity but also when they have enough resources to
be able to aﬀord to delay. However, the latter group may just decide to withdraw from
the labor force and thus claim at the same time. As it is not possible to investigate
retirement and claiming jointly in this framework, the only conclusion we can draw from
these results is that income and labor force status considered separately are not suﬃcient
to explain claiming hazards as their interaction is highly signiﬁcant. In other words, low
income is a trigger for claiming for the unemployed and part-time workers more than for
full-time workers. Likewise, being unemployed or working part-time does not impact the
probability of claiming in a homogeneous way: the eﬀect is signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst and
fourth quartiles for the unemployed; it decreases with income for part-timers; and for
full-time workers, being in the top quartile lowers the odds of claiming.
Table 6 also displays the impact of these interactions, but in the form of marginal
eﬀects (column 2), folllowing the terminology used by Buis [2010]. The relative hazard
of claiming for part-time workers in the ﬁrst quartile is around 2, while this ﬁgure is
only 1.21 for full-time workers. Thus, the marginal eﬀect of being a part-time worker
(compared to a full-time worker) is 0.83 for individuals in the ﬁrst quartile. Likewise,
the marginal eﬀect of being unemployed is 0.72 for those in the ﬁrst income quartile.
These are called marginal eﬀects because they are computed as the diﬀerence between
the expected hazard of claiming for individuals in the same quartile of income but with
distinct labor status, rather than as the derivative of the expected hazard with respect
to the corresponding interaction. Marginal and multiplicative eﬀects diﬀer in that the
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latter are relative to the baseline hazard in their own category, which may vary a lot.
For instance, for the unemployed in the fourth quartile of income, I expect to ﬁnd 2.03
persons who claim for every person who does not, while for the full-time workers in that
quartile of income I expect almost one person to claim for every other one who delays.
Multiplicative eﬀects control for these diﬀerences in baseline hazards between the groups,
hence they produce diﬀering results. However, both columns are accurate representations
of the eﬀect of income and labor force status, and suggest a strong positive eﬀect of being
unemployed in the lower quartiles of income on claiming hazards.
A number of other covariates have an interesting inﬂuence on the likelihood of claiming
SS beneﬁts. High educational attainment lowers that hazard by 20 per cent, as a result of
a better understanding of SS rules and greater ﬁnancial literacy (as ﬁnancial literacy and
education are correlated, see Lusardi and Mitchell [2006], or because a better education
leads to better jobs that people are less eager to leave). Having some health impairment
limiting work multiplies the hazard of claiming by more than 1.2. Indeed those whose
health is an obstacle for continuing work are more likely to retire and thus to claim at
the same time. Health status has probably much to do with the retirement decision,
and indirectly with that of claiming. In contrast, the number of years older individuals
expect to live may inﬂuence both outcomes as those who expect to die soon might want
to enjoy their retirement period sooner, and also claim early because they think they
will not reach the SS break-even age. Therefore, those who estimate their probability
of reaching age 75 to be greater than 50 per cent face a 13 per cent lower hazard than
those who are less conﬁdent about their life expectancy. Receiving some private pension
income has a positive impact on hazard ratios, which is not surprising as those who
have already claimed their private pension beneﬁts are likely to be eager to take their SS
retirement beneﬁts as well. On the other hand, being covered by an employer-provided
health insurance plan leads to delaying claiming. Indeed, as older individuals must wait
until age 65 to ﬁle for Medicare, the availability of health insurance has an important role
to play in loosening the liquidity constraints on those who would not be able to aﬀord
medical care without such insurance, and therefore may induce individuals to retire before
qualifying for Medicare at age 65. As stated in Panis, Hurd, Loughran, Zissimopoulos,
Haider, Clair, Bugliari, Ilchuk, Lopez, Pantoja, et al. [2002],
whether they claim early and reduced Social Security beneﬁts will depend
in part if they are liquidity constrained. Retiree health insurance can reduce
(the risk of) high levels of medical expenditures and thus acts as an increase in
wealth. Covered individuals are therefore more likely to ﬁnance consumption
out of bequeathable wealth and delay claiming beneﬁts.
Although income, wealth, and health status are controlled for, health insurance still has a
signiﬁcant impact, which is consistent with the interpretation that it is due to the risk of
20
a negative health shock and of an urgent need for liquidity rather than to current liquidity
issues or current bad health. Last, wealth also impacts the odds of claiming signiﬁcantly,
but again the pattern is unclear: compared to the fourth quartile, the other quartiles
face greater hazards, depending on speciﬁcations, but the hazard ratios do not decrease
monotonically with wealth, e.g being in the third quartile seems to increase claiming
hazards more than being in the ﬁrst one.
One way of evaluating the goodness-of-ﬁt of the above Cox models consists of using
Cox-Snell (CS) residuals. It has been shown that if the Cox regression model ﬁts the
data well, then the Cox-Snell residuals should have a standard exponential distribution
with a hazard function equal to 1 for all t, and thus the cumulative hazard of the Cox-
Snell residuals should be a straight 45-degree line. By estimating the empirical NA
cumuative hazard function with the CS residuals along with the data's original censoring
variable, it is possible to check if the chosen speciﬁcations are good ﬁts, and further which
speciﬁcation ﬁts the data best. Figure 8 plots the NA cumulative hazard function against
the CS residuals for the three speciﬁcations tested. We observe that all the speciﬁcations
ﬁt the data fairly well. Some variability about the 45-degree line is always expected,
especially in the right-hand tail, because of the reduced eﬀective sample caused by prior
failures and censoring. Apart from that variability, the model with interactions between
labor force status and income quartiles seems to yield a better ﬁt than the other two.
5.3 Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Joint Probability of Claiming
and Retiring at age 62
There is little doubt concerning the existence of an interrelation between claiming and
retirement decisions. The duration model presented above ignores that issue as it consid-
ers claiming as the event causing failure, but does not require claiming to be independent
of retiring. In this cross-sectional analysis, I estimate a bivariate probit of the joint
probability of claiming and retiring at age 62:





Φ(X1iβ1, X2iβ2, ρ)du1idu2i (2)
where Y1i is a dummy for individual i claiming and Y2i a dummy for i retiring, at age 62
for both since the sample is restricted to those who will become 62 enough by the next
wave. Likewise, X1i and X2i are the vectors of the covariates included in the two separate
equations, but in this case they are the same. Φ denotes the bivariate normal cumulative
distribution function. ρ is the correlation coeﬃcient of the errors of the two separate
equations. If the two equations are related, then ρ is non-null and the two decisions share
some common unobserved determinants (taste for leisure, risk aversion, etc.). By using
this bivariate probit model, I address the potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity
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in the risk of claiming that are transmitted via the retirement process, and the possibility
that these determinants are correlated.
The other advantage of this model, if the data is such that the null hypothesis of
ρ = 0 is rejected, is that it makes it possible to predict the joint probabilities for the two
outcomes.
5.4 Empirical Results for Joint Estimates of Claiming and Re-
tirement
Though very useful, Cox regressions cannot study the probability of claiming and staying
in the labor force, i.e. not retiring. I attempt to remedy this ﬂaw by jointly estimat-
ing SS claiming and retirement at age 62 (between the two waves before and after the
62ndbirthday) using a bivariate probit model. The estimates that are presented are the
vectors of parameters β1 and β2 of equation (2) relative to the probability of claiming
and retiring at age 62. Given my research question, I am interested in implementing
a bivariate probit model in order to predict the probability of claiming while not with-
drawing from the labor force, and the impact of interactions between labor force status
and income quartiles on that predicted probability. Tables 7, 8, and 9 display the results
of three distinct speciﬁcations of this model (with labor force status in Table 7, income
quartiles in Table 8, and interactions between labor force status and income quartiles in
Table 9). The ﬁrst thing to notice is that estimating both equations jointly yields better
estimations than estimating two separate models. Indeed, the correlation coeﬃcient ρ
is positive and highly signiﬁcant, meaning that the two equations share some common
unobserved determinants, which inﬂuence both outcomes in the same direction.
Columns (1) and (2) of all three tables show the estimates of the claiming and retire-
ment equations estimated separately. The marginal eﬀect of being unemployed is positive
and signiﬁcant in the two equations (see Table 7), but it is stronger in both magnitude
and signiﬁcance in the claiming one. Unemployment may aﬀect the two outcomes sepa-
rately: through lack of income for claiming, and lack of working activity for retirement.
But at this stage no such conclusion can be drawn as unemployment might also increase
the probability of retiring because it increases that of claiming, and vice versa.
Part-time workers also have higher odds of claiming at age 62, but this eﬀect does
not spread to retirement. In other words, part-time workers are not more prone to stop
working than those who work full-time, although many of them have already reduced the
number of hours in their working week, which is a ﬁrst step toward retirement.
One of the many reasons why this bivariate framework is attractive for modeling
claiming and retirement is that it allows me to decompose the probability of claiming
into the probability of claiming and retiring, and that of claiming and not retiring, the
latter being at the core of the current study. Being unemployed raises the likelihood of
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claiming and retiring at the same time by 16 per cent. More interesting is the eﬀect of
unemployment on the probability of claiming and not retiring. Indeed, the probability of
claiming by the unemployed is greater than that by full-time workers by 23.8 per cent.
Most of this eﬀect (16%) is simultaneous with retirement, but still unemployment also
raises the probability of claiming and staying in the labor force by 7.8 per cent. As for
working part-time, which does not impact the probability of retiring, its marginal eﬀect
of 18.5 per cent is mostly (14 %) driven by its eﬀect on the probability of claiming and not
retiring. Hence, compared to full-time workers, both the jobless and part-time workers
have a higher probability of claiming, even though this does not imply leaving the labor
force, which raises the issue of the role of a lack of resources in this phenomenon.
When income quartiles are included in the regressions instead of labor force status
(see Table 8), the conclusion is more clear-cut: the less income older individuals have,
the sooner they will claim , i.e. at age 62. The same is not true for retirement. Income
quartiles are hardly ever signiﬁcant in the retirement equation, suggesting that retirement
has probably more to do with taste for leisure, type of occupation, etc., than with ﬁnan-
cial characteristics. Being in one of the two bottom quartiles (compared to the fourth
one) raises the probability of claiming and staying in the labor force by more than 14%.
This ﬁgure is lower (8 per cent) for the third quartile, but still highly signiﬁcant. Conse-
quently, lack of income induces people to claim sooner and continue working or looking
for work, which is a ﬁrst step toward showing that individuals use SS retirement beneﬁts
as some kind of social insurance that provides them with enough income to ﬁnance their
consumption while they are earning insuﬃcient salaries or looking for work.
Now that a clear pattern of claiming relative to income and labor force status has
been established, I introduce interactions in the set of explanatory variables in order to
check whether within each category of income distribution, the labor force status has a
discriminating role in the claiming behavior of those who do not withdraw from labor
force. The reference group is made of full-time workers who are in the ﬁrst quartile of
household income, so that if the marginal eﬀect of another labor force status interacted
with the ﬁrst quartile also turns out to be signiﬁcant, it will mean that there are some
labor-force-status-speciﬁc incentives to claim early and stay in the labor force. Table
9 shows that both part-time workers and the unemployed from the ﬁrst quartile have
a greater probability of claiming, but the strongest marginal eﬀect is that on the un-
employed (43.3%). This ﬁnding is also true for part-time workers from the second and
third quartiles. Amongst full-time workers, those from the top quartile are less likely to
claim than their counterparts from the ﬁrst quartile, meaning again that more income
leads to delaying SS claiming. In contrast almost none of these interactions has a signiﬁ-
cant impact on retirement (except for the third quartile interacted with unemployment).
Therefore, being unemployed and in the ﬁrst quartile, as well as working part-time and
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being in the ﬁrst three quartiles, impacts the probability of claiming and not retiring,
but not that of claiming and retiring at the same time. Furthermore, all the impact of
unemployment is on the ﬁrst quartile, meaning two things. First, the impact of unem-
ployment is restricted to those at the bottom of the income distribution, i.e. unemployed
individuals will claim more than full-time workers from the ﬁrst quartile only if they are
also in the ﬁrst quartile. Second, the impact of unemployment goes beyond that of the
consequent lack of income since the omitted group is in the ﬁrst quartile of income too and
hence are as much in need of liquidity as the unemployed. The same goes for part-time
workers since the ﬁrst quartile is also more prone to claim and stay in the labor force,
but contrary to the pattern of the unemployed, other quartiles have signiﬁcant eﬀects
too. Hence the impact of part-time work depends on how much income individuals have,
but is signiﬁcant and positive for the ﬁrst three quartiles whereas only the ﬁrst quartile
is signiﬁcant for the unemployed.
In order to check that these marginal eﬀects of interactions are correct representations
of the impact of these interacted variables, I also display in Table 10 the predicted prob-
abilities of all the outcomes corresponding to each group. The unemployed from the ﬁrst
quartile of income are the most likely to claim SS beneﬁts at 62 with a 0.85 probability,
which is almost twice that for full-time workers from the ﬁrst quartile. The latter have a
23% probability of claiming SS beneﬁts and staying in the labor market, while the former
have 48% chances of doing so. Again, part-time workers and unemployed individuals have
higher probabilities of claiming and continuing to work or looking for work than full-time
workers, and these probabilities are much higher for the lower quartiles.
These results provide evidence in favor of the social insurance role of Social Security
retirement beneﬁts in that low income part-time workers as well as the unemployed at
the bottom of the income distribution claim more without retiring, and no such eﬀect is
observed on retirement, meaning that this claiming decision has ﬁnancial incentives that
are unrelated to retirement motives. Unemployment triggers retirement as well, but only
when not interacted with income. The combination of unemployment and low income
induces claiming while continuing the job-search process, suggesting that this new source
of income may help these individuals to stay in the labor market and retire later.
Concerning the other covariates, few variables impact both decisions. This is, however,
the case for education, whose impact is negative for both outcomes. High educational
attainment lowers the probability of claiming by 11% and that of retiring by 5%, probably
because these individuals enjoy better working and ﬁnancial conditions, and therefore are
less in a hurry to leave the labor market and/or take early SS beneﬁts, all the more
since they may better understand SS rules. Conversely, health limitations raise both
probabilities. Private health insurance coverage has opposite eﬀects on the two outcomes.
Indeed, being covered by some employer-provided health insurance plan has a positive
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impact on the probability of retiring, probably because many of these plans also cover
employees into retirement, but it lowers the probability of claiming, probably due to the
loosening of liquidity constraints that it allows. Again, receiving income from a private
pension plan raises the probability of claiming, but not that of retiring, and also has
a positive impact on the joint probability of claiming and not retiring. As for wealth
quartiles, the pattern of claiming and retirement is quite erratic: when labor force status
is included instead of income quartiles, the less wealthy individuals are, the more they
claim SS beneﬁts without retiring, but this monotonic eﬀect disappears when income is
controlled for. This time, none of the quartiles impact that joint probability, and only
the third quartile has a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on the other probabilities. Thus,
if anything, the general impression is that wealth and income play the same role in their
inﬂuence on claiming behavior, but the impact of wealth is more unclear, and not robust
to the inclusion of income variables.
5.5 Robustness Checks
A few tests can reinforce the insurance interpretation of early SS beneﬁts. First, in order to
diﬀerentiate between this hypothesis and that of the earnings test providing disincentives
to claim if one expects to return to full-time work, I include a subjective measure of these
individual expectations (see section 4.4 for details about this variable) in the previous
estimations. As explained before, labor force status cannot be included at the same time
as this variable is missing for most non-working individuals. However, income variables
are included along with a subjective estimate of the probability of continuing to work
full-time after age 62/65, so that if workers from the bottom income quartiles have higher
odds of claiming early and retiring later, including when their expectations about whether
they will continue full-time work after the earliest age of eligibility are controlled for, then
the assumption that they claim early because they need an alternative source of income
is no longer challenged by that of the earnings test disincentives to claim early if they
expect to return to full-time employment.
Subjective expectations may refer to continuing work after age 62 or age 65, so I create
three categorical variables, the ﬁrst is a dummy for self-estimated expectations of working
full-time after 62 greater than 50%, the second one is for expectations of working full-time
after 65 greater than 50%, and the third variable is equal to the ﬁrst one for individuals
aged below 62, and to the second one for individuals between 62 and 65. Table 11 displays
the results of Cox regressions with and without these expectation variables. Column (1)
shows that the more income individuals have the less they claim. The other three columns
conﬁrm that expecting to continue to work after some point leads to delaying the take-up
of SS beneﬁts. This result is stronger when expectations refer to age 62, with those who
think they have more than 50 per cent chance of working full-time after age 62 facing
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a 62% lower hazard than those who do not think so. More important is the impact of
income quartiles on claiming hazards. Indeed, the hierarchy between income quartiles is
still respected once expectations are part of the set of explanatory variables, and hazard
rates are even greater than in the reference speciﬁcation (column (1)). Being in the ﬁrst
quartile of income increases the claiming hazard by 60% in speciﬁcation (3) compared
to the fourth quartile, while this ﬁgure is only 32% when subjective expectations about
future work are not included (speciﬁcation (1)).
As for the probit results (see Table 12), high expectations of working full-time after
62 decrease both the probabilities of claiming and retiring (marginal eﬀects of -30% and
-24%), but impact the claiming decision more strongly. The decomposition of this eﬀect
(columns (3) and (4)) shows that the negative impact mostly goes through claiming and
retiring at the same time. Indeed, those who think they will work full-time after 62 have
an 8 per cent lower probability of claiming and not retiring than those who think they
will not, which is not much compared to the impact of other variables. Being in the
ﬁrst quartile of income raises that probability by 14.5 per cent compared to being in the
fourth quartile. Even if those people from the bottom quartile were more prone to expect
to stop working after age 62, and therefore more prone to claim (but not to stay in the
labor market) because they are not aﬀected by potential earnings-test disincentives to
claim, this correlation between income quartiles and subjective expectations is controlled
for, so the marginal eﬀects of income quartiles go beyond earnings test incentives and
disincentives to claim or delay.
Finally, as the proportional assumption for the Cox model seemed to be less veriﬁed
for longer durations, I implement PH tests (based on Schoenfeld residuals, or speciﬁc to
those variables that seemed to invalidate the PH assumption) on durations shorter than
25 months (i.e. until the 64th birthday), and reestimate all the regressions under this
restriction. Graphical tests give evidence in favor of the PH assumption since this time the
two curves do not cross each other for high values of analysis time (long durations). The
global test of the PH assumption based on Schoenfeld residuals does not reject anymore
that assumption. As for the Cox results when durations are restricted to being shorter
than 25 months, they conﬁrm and reinforce the role of labor force status and income in
the claiming decision. Indeed, Table 13 shows that the claiming decision is aﬀected by
the same variables as before, only in a stronger way. An unemployed individual faces
twice the claiming hazard rate of a full-time worker, as compared to a hazard ratio of
1.64 when no restriction on durations was imposed. The same goes for low income,
whose eﬀect on claiming hazards is greater when only short durations are considered.
Interactions between labor force status and income quartiles give results which seem
more in accordance than before with the social insurance role played by early SS beneﬁts.
This time, being unemployed and in the ﬁrst quartile of income increases the odds of
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claiming more than working part-time and being in that same quartile (with hazard
ratios respectively of 2.7 and 1.6 compared to full-time workers from the ﬁrst quartile -
see Table 14). Besides, the unemployed from the bottom quartile face a higher claiming
hazard than those from the top quartile, which was not the case in Table 6. Finally,
the last column of Table 14 displays the marginal eﬀects of these interactions, and
also suggests that the unemployed are those who face the greater claiming hazards, with
those from the ﬁrst quartile having chances of claiming that are more than four times
those of not claiming. For all labor statuses, this marginal eﬀect decreases when income
increases; and for (almost) all income quartiles, the unemployed have greater claiming
hazards than part-time workers, who in turn claim more than full-time workers. Hence, far
from questioning the results found before, focusing on short durations leads to a better
understanding of the impact of labor force status and lack of income on the claiming
decision. As the unemployed become fewer and fewer when durations increase, it was
more diﬃcult to pinpoint the eﬀect of joblessness on claiming hazards. What comes up
from the restriction to short durations is a clearcut eﬀect of being unemployed and lacking
income on the probability of claiming early, which therefore reinforces the assumption that
these individuals use early SS beneﬁts as a kind of social insurance that allows them to
ﬁnance consumption when unemployment insurance beneﬁts have run out or are simply
not enough to pull through.
6 Discussion and Conclusive Remarks
Claiming Social Security involves making a decision: claiming early at the cost of perma-
nently reduced beneﬁts and enjoying this new source of income as early as age 62 versus
delaying and collecting higher beneﬁts later and for a shorter period. Some workers choose
to claim beneﬁts early and continue working. They may think that a bird in the hand
is worth two in the bush and be afraid of being made worse oﬀ by reforms to the SS
system. Or else they may want to ﬁle for SS beneﬁts and suspend their receipt in order to
be able to restart collecting their beneﬁts quickly if they lose their job, for instance. The
picture is quite diﬀerent for the unemployed. The jobless are more likely to claim early
beneﬁts than their working counterparts. This is a typical ﬁnding of the outstandingly
rich retirement literature. But they are believed to claim early because they retire early.
The fact that there is a group of unemployed individuals who claim at age 62 while not
exiting the labor force at the same time, meaning that they continue their job search,
might give another meaning to the early claiming pattern.
My hypothesis is that when they have no liquidity to ﬁnance their consumption while
waiting for future higher beneﬁts, the unemployed may use Social Security as a safety net
to maintain their lifestyle during their job search process.
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In this paper I have found evidence of a claiming pattern speciﬁc to the unemployed.
Being unemployed and in the left tail of the income distribution strongly predicts early
claiming and not retiring. I have also found that low-income part-time workers have a
higher probability of claiming and staying in the labor force than low-income full-time
workers. Hence, part-time workers seem to claim for liquidity purposes too, but I have
chosen to focus on ﬁnding evidence of the impact of lack of income on SS claiming for the
unemployed, because showing that the jobless already use SS as a form of unemployment
insurance contributes to building a rationale for integrating Unemployment Insurance
with Social Security.
I believe these ﬁndings should be taken into account when thinking of the welfare
implications of early claiming. Indeed, the main concern raised by the massive early
claiming phenomenon is that although it is roughly actuarially neutral to public ﬁnances,
it might lower the living standards of the elderly. As stated in Gruber and Orszag [2000],
this concern is heightened by the fact that the average annual beneﬁt among
older widows whose spouses had claimed early beneﬁts was slightly below the
poverty line in 1998, whereas the average annual beneﬁt among older widows
whose spouses had not claimed early beneﬁts was more than $1,800 above the
poverty line.
This is precisely why the earnings test condition has been maintained between age 62 and
the full retirement age, in order to protect the more elderly against poverty by withholding
and hence deferring some part of their beneﬁts until they stop working or reach the FRA.
Nevertheless, 74 percent of the 33.5 million retired workers currently receive reduced
beneﬁts because of entitlement prior to full retirement age. Therefore, early entitlement
to SS beneﬁts seems to meet urgent needs for many older individuals, which should
also be borne in mind when investigating the early claiming issue normatively. The
recent worldwide economic crisis has reminded the developed world of the importance of
a safety net. With the bulk of savings used for Social Security programs, the amount
individuals have at their disposal to insure themselves against negative income shocks
such as unemployment is limited. Besides, capital markets are largely incomplete, which
makes it almost imposible for older individuals to borrow against future earnings. As a
result, older individuals in need of liquidity claim SS beneﬁts as soon as they become
eligible, even if this entails leaving some money on the table. This naturally leads to the
suggestion of an integrated unemployment and pension program. Indeed, if unemployed
individuals had the possibility of drawing money from individual accounts ﬁlled with
their own retirement wealth, it would allow them to use their retirement credits at any
moment in their lives for short periods of job displacement, ﬁnance their job search and
participate longer in the workforce. Furthermore, the fact that it is their own retirement
wealth that they draw down would increase their incentive to ﬁnd a job, contrary to
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traditional unemployment insurance that is known to lead to adverse disincentive eﬀects.
Hence, any policy aiming at forcing individuals to delay the claiming of SS beneﬁts for
their own good might well be mistaken. As for public ﬁnances, the timing of SS claiming
is actuarially fair, so that early claiming is neither a bad nor a good thing, except that if
it keeps older individuals at work, it can be considered as a boon for a government whose
interest is in making older individuals contribute longer to society, through payroll taxes
for instance.
I believe this framework of thought opens up some very interesting avenues for further
research, starting with the need to ﬁnd evidence for longer durations in the labor force
for the unemployed who claim early compared with those who postpone their claim. A
second step could consist of modelling the job search process in order to compare the
outcomes for early claimers and late claimers, and see if those who can use SS beneﬁts as
an insurance have a higher probability of ﬁnding a job.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Institutional Features of Social Security
Beneﬁts are adjusted to produce permanently lower or higher beneﬁts for those who claim
before or after the FRA, so that the system is roughly actuarially neutral: beneﬁts are
reduced by 5/9 of one percent for each month they are received prior to the FRA up to
36 months, and 5/12 of one percent thereafter. Hence, the formula relating the monthly
beneﬁt amount (MBA) to the Primary Insurance amount (PIA) for someone claiming SS












∗PIA, where n1 is the number of months before
the FRA if the individual claims between 0 and 36 months before the FRA, n2 is the
number of months after the ﬁrst 36 months before the FRA if the individual claims more
than 36 months early, and ARF is the actuarial reduction factor. Thus, claiming at age
62 instead of 66 reduces the monthly beneﬁt by
[
36 ∗ 5900 + 12 ∗ 51200
]
per cent, i.e. by
25 per cent. The following table gives the values of the adjustment factor δt and the
actuarial reduction factor ARF for every age, computed using the formula above.











Likewise, the delayed retirement credit has increased substantially over the years, from
1/4 of one percent for those born between 1917 and 1924 to 2/3 of one percent for those
born after 1943.
Another particular feature of this institutional structure is that spouses and survivors
have the right to become entitled to special Social Security beneﬁts: spousal beneﬁts are
payable when they exceed the beneﬁt payable by reason of the woman's own earnings
record (married men are also entitled to these beneﬁts but they rarely have much value
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because married men usually have larger PIAs than their wives, and usually pre-decease
them). The spousal beneﬁt equals 50 percent of the husband's PIA when claimed at the
wife's FRA. She can claim it as early as age 62, provided her husband has already claimed,
with a subsequent reduction6. In the past, if a worker delayed collecting Social Security,
the spouse would not be able to collect spousal beneﬁts and would not receive delayed
retirement credits either, which reduced the value of delaying Social Security for many
couples. Changes made under the Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act of 2000 allow
a worker to ﬁle and suspend Social Security beneﬁts once the FRA has been reached,
allowing the spouse to begin receiving spousal beneﬁts based on the worker's record while
the worker continues to accrue delayed retirement credits. Surviving spouses of retired
workers are entitled to a survivor beneﬁt of 100% of the retired worker's beneﬁt, which can
be greater or less than his PIA, depending on the age when he ﬁrst claimed beneﬁt. The
beneﬁt can be claimed once the survivor is 60, and is subject to a reduction depending
on the survivor's age when the beneﬁt begins7.
6Spousal beneﬁt is subject to a reduction of 25/36 of one percent for each month it is received prior
to the FRA up to 36 months, and 5/12 of one percent thereafter. There is no delayed retirement credit.
7This reduction is of 0.475 percent for each month it is received prior to the wife's FRA for women
born in 1939 or earlier, decreasing to 0.339 percent a month for those born in 1962 or later. It is not
increased if the husband's death occurs after the wife's FRA.
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7.2 Results
Table 2: Summary statistics
Duration Model Cross-Sectional Model
Variable Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N
male 0.577 (0.494) 7,221 0.554 (0.497) 3,879
marital status: in couple 0.782 (0.413) 7,218 0.788 (0.409) 3,878
education: high attainment 0.461 (0.499) 7,221 0.445 (0.497) 3,879
number of people living in the household 2.36 (1.171) 7,220 2.378 (1.181) 3,879
age 62.034 (2.048) 7,221 60.68 (0.617) 3,879
health: excellent 0.201 (0.401) 7,218 0.201 (0.401) 3,877
health limits work 0.068 (0.252) 6,973 0.074 (0.262) 3,840
subjective prob. of living to 75>50 0.645 (0.478) 6,672 0.631 (0.483) 3,717
receives pension income 0.102 (0.303) 7,221 0.09 (0.286) 3,879
total household wealth (million$) 0.298 (0.359) 6,973 0.281 (0.341) 3,771
worked 10-19 years 0.058 (0.234) 7,221 0.059 (0.235) 3,879
worked 20-29 years 0.114 (0.317) 7,221 0.121 (0.326) 3,879
worked 30-39 years 0.205 (0.404) 7,221 0.233 (0.423) 3,879
worked 40-49 years 0.583 (0.493) 7,221 0.588 (0.492) 3,879
worked over 50 years 0.04 (0.195) 7,221 0 (0) 3,879
subj. prob. of continuing work after 62> 50 0.626 (0.484) 3,862 0.597 (0.491) 3,351
subj. prob. of continuing work after 65> 50 0.286 (0.452) 4,603 0.247 (0.432) 3,432
subj. prob. of continuing work after 62/65> 50 0.529 (0.499) 4,606 0.562 (0.496) 3,435
total hh income (hundreds of thousand$) 0.846 (0.647) 7,050 0.812 (0.611) 3,797
works FT 0.843 (0.364) 7,221 0.831 (0.375) 3,879
works PT 0.139 (0.346) 7,221 0.146 (0.353) 3,879
unemployed 0.018 (0.132) 7,221 0.023 (0.151) 3,879
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Table 3: Distribution of claiming spells
Sample Subjects Final Exit Time Nb Failures
mean median (%)
works FT 3,850 27.4 25 2,853 (74)
works PT 855 32.09 17 514 (60.1)
unemployed 127 17.65 9 78 (61.4)
1st quartile of hh income 474 26.21 15 282 (59.5)
2nd quartile of hh income 966 27.41 20 593 (61.4)
3rd quartile of hh income 1,716 25.84 19 1,108 (64.6)
4th quartile of hh income 2,142 29 26 1,400 (65.3)
1st quartile of total wealth 893 26.71 20 576 (64.5)
2nd quartile of total wealth 1,397 25.06 19 886 (63.4)
3rd quartile of total wealth 1,543 26.61 22 974 (63.1)
4th quartile of total wealth 1,457 30.26 26 910 (62.5)
Total 4,603 28.1 23 3,445 (74.8)
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Table 4: Summary statistics on early vs delayed claiming by labor force status
Delay Claim Total
Labor Force Status No. Row % No. Row % No. Row %
works ft 2,026 64.09 1,135 35.91 3,161 100.00
works pt 241 43.42 314 56.58 555 100.00
unemployed 35 38.89 55 61.11 90 100.00
Total 2,302 60.48 1,504 39.52 3,806 100.00
Total hh Income No. Row % No. Row % No. Row %
1st quartile 152 49.67 154 50.33 306 100.00
2nd quartile 342 53.27 300 46.73 642 100.00
3rd quartile 677 56.51 521 43.49 1,198 100.00
4th quartile 1,071 67.83 508 32.17 1,579 100.00
Total 2,242 60.19 1,483 39.81 3,725 100.00
Total hh Wealth No. Row % No. Row % No. Row %
1st quartile 376 59.49 256 40.51 632 100.00
2nd quartile 583 58.01 422 41.99 1,005 100.00
3rd quartile 578 56.34 448 43.66 1,026 100.00
4th quartile 686 66.22 350 33.78 1,036 100.00
Total 2,223 60.10 1,476 39.90 3,699 100.00
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Table 5: SS take-up hazard estimates from Cox regressions
(1) (2) (3)
male 0.896** 0.861*** 0.902**
(-2.54) (-3.51) (-2.36)
education: high attainment 0.783*** 0.810*** 0.808***
(-6.25) (-5.19) (-5.25)
marital status: in couple 1.205*** 1.311*** 1.274***
(3.64) (4.98) (4.45)
number of people living in the household 0.941*** 0.935*** 0.939***
(-3.47) (-3.79) (-3.54)
health: excellent 0.929 0.943 0.946
(-1.50) (-1.18) (-1.13)
health limits work 1.223*** 1.228*** 1.211***
(2.96) (3.02) (2.82)
subjective prob. of living to 75>50 0.867*** 0.879*** 0.874***
(-3.73) (-3.35) (-3.47)
receives pension income 1.114* 1.143** 1.121*
(1.78) (2.19) (1.88)
covered by private hlth insurance 0.883*** 0.837*** 0.892***
(-3.00) (-4.37) (-2.71)
worked 10-19 years 0.662*** 0.685*** 0.639***
(-4.93) (-4.53) (-5.31)
worked 20-29 years 0.937 0.936 0.921
(-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.32)
worked 30-39 years 0.908** 0.919* 0.908*
(-1.96) (-1.70) (-1.94)
worked over 40 years ref. ref. ref.
ﬁrst quartile of total wealth 1.079 0.979 0.987
(1.25) (-0.34) (-0.21)
second quartile of total wealth 1.138** 1.054 1.059
(2.47) (0.96) (1.05)
third quartile of total wealth 1.152*** 1.111** 1.109**
(2.88) (2.09) (2.06)
fourth quartile of total wealth ref. ref. ref.
works FT ref. ref. ref.




ﬁrst quartile of hh income 1.323*** 1.277***
(3.47) (3.02)
second quartile of hh income 1.241*** 1.216***
(3.54) (3.20)
third quartile of hh income 1.194*** 1.189***
(3.85) (3.75)
fourth quartile of hh income ref. ref.
Observations 6,273 6,193 6,193
Hazard ratios; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6: SS take-up hazard estimates from Cox regressions:
Impact of labor force status*income quartiles
labor force status quartile hazard ratios relative hazard
























Standard deviations in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 for hazard ratios
Controls included: gender, marital status, education, number of people in the household, health, health insurance,
self-expectations of mortality, private pension income, job history, total household wealth.
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Table 7: Bivariate probit estimates, including labor force status variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(Cl=1) P(Ret=1) P(Cl=1,Ret=1) P(Cl=1,Ret=0)
male -0.042** -0.011 -0.015 -0.027*
(-2.10) (-0.67) (-1.14) (-1.82)
education: high attainment -0.126*** -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.067***
(-7.04) (-3.44) (-4.85) (-5.16)
marital status: in couple 0.081*** 0.026 0.033** 0.048***
(3.57) (1.37) (2.22) (2.98)
number of people in the hhold -0.027*** -0.001 -0.006 -0.021***
(-3.33) (-0.17) (-1.09) (-3.56)
health: excellent -0.047** -0.068*** -0.055*** 0.009
(-2.13) (-4.08) (-4.04) (0.52)
health limits work 0.068** 0.044 0.044* 0.024
(2.05) (1.58) (1.84) (0.98)
subj. prob. of living to 75>50 -0.027 -0.021 -0.020 -0.007
(-1.47) (-1.44) (-1.60) (-0.52)
receives pension income 0.075** 0.015 0.023 0.052**
(2.42) (0.58) (1.08) (2.18)
covered by private hlth insurance -0.088*** 0.047*** 0.019 -0.107***
(-4.54) (3.05) (1.46) (-7.07)
worked 10-19 years -0.043 -0.066** -0.053** 0.010
(-1.15) (-2.35) (-2.33) (0.34)
worked 20-29 years -0.037 0.051** 0.024 -0.061***
(-1.31) (2.04) (1.23) (-3.30)
worked 30-39 years -0.037* -0.001 -0.008 -0.029*
(-1.71) (-0.08) (-0.56) (-1.86)
worked 40-49 years ref. ref. ref. ref.
ﬁrst quartile of total wealth 0.035 -0.044** -0.026 0.061***
(1.19) (-2.01) (-1.41) (2.68)
second quartile of total wealth 0.049** -0.003 0.007 0.042**
(1.98) (-0.13) (0.41) (2.25)
third quartile of total wealth 0.084*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.031*
(3.51) (2.62) (3.10) (1.78)
fourth quartile of total wealth ref. ref. ref. ref.
works FT ref. ref. ref. ref.
works PT 0.185*** 0.021 0.043** 0.141***
(6.93) (0.92) (2.15) (6.27)
unemployed 0.238*** 0.154*** 0.160*** 0.078*




Marginal eﬀects; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Bivariate probit estimates, including income variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(Cl=1) P(Ret=1) P(Cl=1,Ret=1) P(Cl=1,Ret=0)
male -0.063*** -0.014 -0.021 -0.042***
(-3.19) (-0.86) (-1.59) (-2.87)
education: high attainment -0.106*** -0.054*** -0.057*** -0.049***
(-5.71) (-3.52) (-4.53) (-3.63)
marital status: in couple 0.128*** 0.028 0.045*** 0.084***
(5.56) (1.43) (2.93) (5.22)
number of people in the hhold -0.027*** -0.003 -0.007 -0.020***
(-3.32) (-0.44) (-1.29) (-3.35)
health: excellent -0.036 -0.070*** -0.056*** 0.019
(-1.63) (-4.19) (-3.99) (1.13)
health limits work 0.074** 0.048* 0.048** 0.026
(2.22) (1.70) (1.97) (1.05)
subj. prob. of living to 75>50 -0.019 -0.021 -0.018 -0.000
(-1.02) (-1.41) (-1.46) (-0.02)
receives pension income 0.076** 0.016 0.024 0.052**
(2.43) (0.61) (1.10) (2.15)
covered by private hlth insurance -0.111*** 0.038** 0.009 -0.120***
(-5.79) (2.45) (0.70) (-7.97)
worked 10-19 years -0.020 -0.059** -0.045* 0.025
(-0.54) (-2.05) (-1.90) (0.83)
worked 20-29 years -0.024 0.054** 0.030 -0.054***
(-0.85) (2.12) (1.46) (-2.86)
worked 30-39 years -0.034 0.003 -0.005 -0.029*
(-1.55) (0.14) (-0.33) (-1.85)
worked 40-49 years ref. ref. ref. ref.
ﬁrst quartile of total wealth -0.034 -0.038 -0.033* -0.002
(-1.15) (-1.60) (-1.67) (-0.07)
second quartile of total wealth 0.001 0.006 0.004 -0.003
(0.05) (0.28) (0.25) (-0.17)
third quartile of total wealth 0.059** 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.010
(2.42) (2.60) (2.81) (0.58)
fourth quartile of total wealth ref. ref. ref. ref.
ﬁrst quartile of hh income 0.194*** 0.028 0.049* 0.144***
(5.05) (0.87) (1.66) (4.49)
second quartile of hh income 0.130*** -0.039* -0.012 0.142***
(4.43) (-1.80) (-0.60) (5.94)
third quartile of hh income 0.081*** -0.024 -0.003 0.084***
(3.69) (-1.35) (-0.21) (5.06)




Marginal eﬀects; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 9: Marginal eﬀects of the interactions on the joint outcomes from the bivariate
probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
labor force quartile P(Cl=1) P(Ret=1) P(Cl=1,Ret=1) P(Cl=1,Ret=0)
works FT 1st ref. ref. ref. ref.
2nd -0.031 -0.051 -0.042 0.010
(-0.75) (-1.60) (-1.56) (0.32)
3rd -0.053 -0.032 -0.032 -0.021
(-1.31) (-0.98) (-1.19) (-0.70)
4th -0.123*** -0.001 -0.026 -0.098***
(-2.99) (-0.04) (-0.90) (-3.37)
works PT 1st 0.223*** 0.076 0.093 0.130**
(3.35) (1.22) (1.60) (2.25)
2nd 0.286*** -0.031 -0.000 0.286***
(4.46) (-0.62) (-0.01) (4.55)
3rd 0.116** 0.001 0.018 0.098**
(1.97) (0.03) (0.42) (2.04)
4th -0.024 -0.012 -0.013 -0.011
(-0.44) (-0.27) (-0.35) (-0.28)
unemployed 1st 0.433*** 0.139 0.168 0.266**
(4.24) (1.14) (1.40) (2.06)
2nd 0.119 0.143 0.126 -0.007
(1.05) (1.32) (1.33) (-0.09)
3rd 0.119 0.219* 0.174 -0.055
(0.95) (1.73) (1.60) (-0.74)
4th 0.111 0.042 0.050 0.061




Marginal eﬀects; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Controls included: gender, marital status, education, number of people in the household, health, health insurance,
self-expectations of mortality, private pension income, job history, total household wealth.
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Table 10: Predicted probabilities of the joint outcomes from the bivariate probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
labor force quartile P(Cl=1) P(Ret=1) P(Cl=1,Ret=1) P(Cl=1,Ret=0)
works FT 1st 0.432 0.229 0.201 0.231
(0.039) (0.033) (0.028) (0.030)
2nd 0.400 0.177 0.157 0.243
(0.025) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020)
3rd 0.379 0.196 0.169 0.210
(0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
4th 0.309 0.228 0.173 0.136
(0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010)
works PT 1st 0.654 0.308 0.296 0.358
(0.056) (0.056) (0.053) (0.051)
2nd 0.714 0.197 0.195 0.518
(0.050) (0.043) (0.042) (0.054)
3rd 0.550 0.230 0.218 0.332
(0.044) (0.036) (0.033) (0.038)
4th 0.407 0.216 0.188 0.220
(0.039) (0.033) (0.028) (0.030)
unemployed 1st 0.849 0.372 0.370 0.479
(0.089) (0.120) (0.118) (0.123)
2nd 0.553 0.377 0.334 0.218
(0.107) (0.104) (0.093) (0.074)
3rd 0.553 0.453 0.387 0.166
(0.119) (0.121) (0.107) (0.073)
4th 0.544 0.273 0.253 0.292
(0.094) (0.085) (0.077) (0.077)
These ﬁgures are predicted probabilities, not marginal eﬀects; standard errors in parenthesis.
Other covariates(gender, marital status, education, number of people in the household, health, health insurance,
self-expectations of mortality, private pension income, job history, total household wealth) are held at their means.
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Table 11: SS take-up hazard estimates from Cox regressions-with controls for expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ﬁrst quartile of hh income 1.323*** 1.521*** 1.598*** 1.524***
(3.47) (3.90) (4.70) (4.21)
second quartile of hh income 1.241*** 1.375*** 1.319*** 1.273***
(3.54) (3.75) (3.57) (3.11)
third quartile of hh income 1.194*** 1.299*** 1.270*** 1.271***
(3.85) (3.90) (4.02) (4.04)
fourth quartile of hh income ref. ref. ref. ref.
subj. prob. of continuing work after 62>50 0.378***
(-17.71)
subj. prob. of continuing work after 65>50 0.523***
(-10.53)
subj. prob. of continuing work after 62/65>50 0.474***
(-15.05)
Observations 6,193 3,575 4,233 4,235
Hazard ratios; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Controls included: gender, marital status, education, number of people in the household, health, health insurance,
self-expectations of mortality, private pension income, job history, total household wealth.
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Table 12: Bivariate probit estimates-with controls for expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(Claim=1) P(Retire=1) P(Cl=1,Ret=1) P(Cl=1,Ret=0)
male -0.047** 0.002 -0.007 -0.040**
(-2.18) (0.12) (-0.52) (-2.45)
education: high attainment -0.083*** -0.026* -0.033*** -0.051***
(-4.19) (-1.67) (-2.59) (-3.40)
marital status: in couple 0.096*** -0.010 0.013 0.082***
(3.79) (-0.45) (0.82) (4.60)
number of people in the hhold -0.021** 0.003 -0.002 -0.019***
(-2.43) (0.49) (-0.29) (-3.00)
health: excellent -0.016 -0.062*** -0.046*** 0.030
(-0.66) (-3.59) (-3.24) (1.58)
health limits work 0.036 0.031 0.028 0.008
(1.02) (1.09) (1.19) (0.31)
subj. prob. of living to 75>50 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.010
(0.67) (0.07) (0.25) (0.68)
receives pension income 0.068** 0.000 0.011 0.057**
(2.04) (0.02) (0.52) (2.16)
covered by private hlth insurance -0.113*** 0.043*** 0.013 -0.127***
(-5.43) (2.74) (1.01) (-7.53)
worked 10-19 years -0.072* -0.063** -0.054** -0.018
(-1.87) (-2.24) (-2.48) (-0.59)
worked 20-29 years -0.033 0.052** 0.026 -0.059***
(-1.11) (2.00) (1.28) (-2.91)
worked 30-39 years -0.043* 0.008 -0.003 -0.040**
(-1.84) (0.39) (-0.22) (-2.32)
worked 40-49 years ref. ref. ref. ref.
ﬁrst quartile of total wealth -0.030 -0.040* -0.033* 0.003
(-0.93) (-1.65) (-1.66) (0.11)
second quartile of total wealth 0.021 0.009 0.010 0.011
(0.74) (0.38) (0.53) (0.53)
third quartile of total wealth 0.067** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.014
(2.57) (2.76) (3.01) (0.72)
fourth quartile of total wealth ref. ref. ref. ref.
ﬁrst quartile of hh income 0.184*** 0.019 0.040 0.145***
(4.36) (0.55) (1.30) (4.04)
second quartile of hh income 0.140*** -0.038* -0.009 0.150***
(4.39) (-1.70) (-0.48) (5.64)
third quartile of hh income 0.083*** -0.027 -0.005 0.088***
(3.49) (-1.50) (-0.35) (4.78)
fourth quartile of hh income ref. ref. ref. ref.
subj. prob. of continuing work after 62>50 -0.304*** -0.238*** -0.222*** -0.082***




Marginal eﬀects; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 13: SS take-up hazard estimates from Cox regressions-Restricted to short durations
(1) (2) (3)
male 0.933 0.871** 0.930
(-1.21) (-2.45) (-1.26)
education: high attainment 0.697*** 0.752*** 0.740***
(-6.78) (-5.15) (-5.45)
marital status: in couple 1.218*** 1.393*** 1.340***
(2.85) (4.58) (4.02)
number of people living in the household 0.949** 0.942** 0.948**
(-2.27) (-2.56) (-2.32)
health: excellent 0.863** 0.882* 0.880*
(-2.21) (-1.87) (-1.91)
health limits work 1.196** 1.219** 1.191**
(2.10) (2.33) (2.06)
subjective prob. of living to 75>50 0.921 0.940 0.934
(-1.64) (-1.23) (-1.35)
receives pension income 1.181** 1.206** 1.192**
(2.05) (2.29) (2.15)
covered by private hlth insurance 0.748*** 0.685*** 0.760***
(-5.48) (-7.31) (-5.11)
worked 10-19 years 0.974 1.024 0.935
(-0.25) (0.23) (-0.65)
worked 20-29 years 0.924 0.948 0.901
(-0.99) (-0.66) (-1.29)
worked 30-39 years 0.886* 0.898* 0.882*
(-1.86) (-1.65) (-1.92)
worked over 40 years ref. ref. ref.
ﬁrst quartile of total wealth 1.136 0.944 0.958
(1.56) (-0.66) (-0.49)
second quartile of total wealth 1.197** 1.061 1.060
(2.54) (0.80) (0.78)
third quartile of total wealth 1.304*** 1.201*** 1.216***
(3.90) (2.64) (2.81)
fourth quartile of total wealth ref. ref. ref.
works FT ref. ref. ref.




ﬁrst quartile of hh income 1.660*** 1.546***
(5.11) (4.34)
second quartile of hh income 1.407*** 1.377***
(4.31) (4.06)
third quartile of hh income 1.275*** 1.283***
(3.94) (4.03)
fourth quartile of hh income ref. ref.
Observations 3,694 3,647 3,647
Hazard ratios; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
46
Table 14: SS take-up hazard estimates from Cox regressions:
Impact of labor force status*income quartiles-Restricted to short durations
labor force status quartile hazard ratios relative hazard
























Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 for hazard ratios
Controls included: gender, marital status, education, number of people in the household, health, health insurance,
self-expectations of mortality, private pension income, job history, total household wealth.
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